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1) Introduction 
A serious blemish of the present economic era is the high rates of 
unemployment which currently afflict developed countries.  Unemployment 
has reached high levels in several European countries as the following figures 
suggest. It is nearly 10% of the labour force in France, 24.5% in Greece, 15.3% 
in Ireland, 10.8% in Italy, 25.2% in Spain, 16.4% in Portugal, 8.1% in Sweden, 
8.2% in the UK, and 8.2% in USA. The average OECD unemployment increased 
from 6.8% in 2005, and 6.2% in 2006 to 8.2% in 2011 and 8.2% in 2012.1  In 
addition there is further unemployment due to factors such as the 
discouraged worker effect and the high incidence of involuntary part-time 
work.  
These unemployment rates together with the corresponding growth rates may 
be compared with those of the period 1950-1973, the so-called Golden Age, 
when Western Europe managed very high rates of growth of wages, shorter 
hours of work and full employment (see table 1 and 2).  The average annual 
rate of unemployment in Germany between 1963-1973 was about 1%.  Most 
people will accept that if this rate is corrected for normal frictional 
unemployment it would represent the full employment rate. Indeed it can be 
argued that in France and Germany there was over full employment in the 
sense that not only the domestic labour force was more or less fully employed, 
almost 10% of the employed labour force came from abroad.  It is the 
overarching record of employment, output and productivity growth during the 
third quarter of the 20th Century which leads economic historians to regard 
                                                          
1
 The source of these figures is OECD (2013) 
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this period as the golden age of capitalism.  During this duration leading 
industrial countries expanded at a rate of nearly 5% per annum which is almost 
twice the rate of expansion they had experienced over any comparable period 
in the previous two hundred years (see table 3).  How did this come about?  If 
it can provide full employment, why cannot such a regime be instituted today?  
How and why did it come to an end?   
To answer such big questions, the appropriate methodology would necessarily 
involve a historical and institutional approach to these issues. 
The main purpose of this paper is to discuss the nature of the regulatory 
regime which made possible the outstanding economic success of the Golden 
Age period. A second issue which will be commented upon here, albeit briefly, 
is the question of entrepreneurship. The role of government as an 
entrepreneur will be discussed in this section of the paper. The whole paper 
will thus cover the two main themes of this conference – regulations and 
entrepreneurship. Moreover, contrary to first impressions, the present paper 
combines micro- and macro-economic analysis in reaching its conclusions - it is 
not based on a macro-economic investigation alone. The paper argues inter 
alia that for a macro-economic growth path to be perpetuated, it needs to be 
compatible with the behaviour of millions of individual agents at a micro-
economic level. Other relevant characteristics of the Golden Age will be 
commented upon below. 
1) The Golden Age regulatory regime 
 
The story of the Golden Age in factual terms is quite straightforward. The West 
European economies grew at their fastest rate ever during the Golden Age.  In 
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the last two centuries (since 1820), there has been no comparable period with 
a higher growth rate. However, since the Golden Age European economic 
performance has declined. During the last twenty years it has been less strong 
than the American economic record. Before the world economic crisis which 
began in 2008 with the demise of Lehman Brothers, it used to be common for 
American commentators to argue that Europe needs serious reform in the 
sense of adopting American-type economic institutions, if it is to restore its full 
growth potential. This conclusion is also accepted by some leading European 
economists (Alesina and Giavazzi, 2006; Carlin 2007). 
As the exposition of this paper takes a somewhat unconventional course, it 
may be useful at this point to summarise the main theses of the paper: 
a) Due to the length, breadth, and depth, of The Golden Age economic 
boom, it cannot be explained simply as a product of a chance 
combination of favourable circumstances. 
b) It was the outcome of a unique regulatory regime (explained in detail 
below), very different from that prevailing in the inter-war period as well 
as that adopted in the 1990s and 2000s by West European countries.   
c) The regulatory regime reflected in part a carefully designed strategy and 
involved gigantic institutional innovations by leading industrial countries 
at both national and international levels. 
d) Its demise occurred because the institutional framework was overtaken 
by events.  For the Golden Age to continue some of the extant 
institutions would have had to adapt to the new situation.  Fresh 
institutions would also have been needed. 
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e) An analytical and historical examination of this period has important 
policy lessons for the restoration of full employment in Western 
Europe.2 
In the context of this Conference, this paper will argue that the superior 
economic record of the Golden Age was due to the regulatory and institutional 
framework which was adopted by these countries during this period.  
At the simplest level, it may be argued that the success of the Golden Age in 
Europe, was entirely due to the fact that the Europeans had greater 
destruction on account of World War 2 than other regions. Reconstruction 
could ostensibly create a huge demand for goods and services and hence lead 
to a faster rate of growth. Although this theory is plausible, it is not accurate. It 
took European countries a remarkably short time to reach their pre-WW2 
production levels, in particular, to reach the 1938 level of production.  As 
Crafts and Toniolo (1996) suggest, although the destruction during the Second 
World War was quite severe in many countries, the speed of recovery 
throughout Europe was also exceptional. They write - “In five years, at most, 
development covered the ground lost relative to the highest pre-War income 
level.” (p.3)  
Another seemingly plausible theory which does not fit the facts is that the 
Golden Age boom was a product of Keynesian demand management policies. 
In an important paper, Matthews (1968) pointed out that there was little 
deficit spending in post-WW2 UK. The country generally speaking enjoyed 
                                                          
2 The analysis of this paper is based on Glyn, Hughes, Lipietz and Singh (1990), Singh (1990) and 
Singh (2008). It also updates the last two papers. 
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fiscal surpluses rather than implement deficit financing in order to maintain 
the level of demand. The Golden Age boom was a creation of the private 
sector.3 
Glyn et al (1990) provide a comprehensive analysis of the rise and fall of the 
Golden Age. It is pedagogically useful to follow them in their four-fold 
classification of the analysis of the various aspects of the Golden Age. They 
distinguish between a macro-economic pattern which summarises the main 
characteristics of the growth path. The authors place special emphasis here on 
the profits – investments – productivity – wages – profits nexus.   In the second 
place, they provide an analysis of the system of production which brings out 
the main characteristics of the application of modern assembly line production 
techniques from the US to Europe. Further there was a similar transfer of the 
Taylorist principles of scientific management from the US to the European 
industry. In the third area of analysis, the four authors concentrate on the 
institutional and behavioural framework which produces compatibility 
between individual behaviour and macro-economic patterns. The last element 
in their description of the Golden Age pattern of development is international 
regulation which has to be compatible with internal regulation in order to 
achieve optimal economic performance.  
2) International regulation 
It may be useful to elaborate first on the question of international regulation.  
The new international economic order which came into being after the Second 
                                                          
3
 Maddison (2001) however provides a somewhat different interpretation of the Golden Age boom. He 
suggests that it was a fundamentally Keynesian phenomenon in that the private sector knew that the 
government will not let a deficiency of aggregate demand to occur and therefore, corporations could invest 
with much less risk than would otherwise be the case. 
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World War was not a spontaneous development.  It was carefully planned, 
mainly by the governments of the US and the UK while World War 2 was still in 
progress.  The motivation underlying this development was the conviction of 
Cordell Hull (US Secretary of State at the time) that the peace and security of 
the US were best guaranteed by the establishment after the war of a liberal 
capitalist regime in all parts of the world.  Hull attributed the Great Depression 
to protectionist policies followed in the pre-depression period.  These policies, 
in his view, not only led to mass unemployment but also to war.  
There was general agreement among the Allies that the leadership of the new 
post-War system will have to be assumed by the US as the UK was made much 
weaker by the war.  The Bretton Woods Conference  resulted from these ideas 
and established the outlines of a new post-War international economic order.  
This required the establishment of a number of international organisations 
(listed below) for the smooth functioning of the world economy. 
1) An international organisation for maintenance of exchange stability and 
to deal with balance of payments problems. 
2) An international organisation to deal with long-term international 
investment. 
3) An international agreement on primary-commodity price control. 
4) International measures for the reduction of trade barriers. 
5) The international organisation of relief and reconstruction. 
6) International measures to maintain full employment. 
In the event, after the war only about half of these organisations were 
established but they were nevertheless sufficient to provide a solid 
international backing to international trade and investment between 
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countries. One of the most important events of this period, particularly from 
the European perspective, was the American implementation of the Marshall 
Plan. GHLS (1990) observe that the magnitude of Marshall Aid was very large 
and amounted to 1% of US GDP for each of the four years 1948-52. Its 
important objectives were restoration of multilateralism, price stability and 
recovery of production and it involved heavy conditionality for the European 
countries. As a result of the Plan there was, for example, a major realignment 
of European currencies. European countries were also encouraged to 
collaborate with each other in economic terms. It is generally agreed that the 
Marshall Plan was a great success economically as well as politically, both from 
the American and European points of view. As Spiro (1977) noted in relation to 
the US gains from the Plan: 
‘In the short term the US dealt with its own huge balance of trade surplus and the 
European and Japanese deficits by foreign aid and military expenditure … In addition 
the US encouraged European and Japanese trade protectionism and discrimination 
against the dollar …. To encourage long term adjustment the US promoted European 
and Japanese trade competitiveness.  Policies for economic controls on the defeated 
Axis countries were scrapped.  Aid to Europe and Japan was designed to rebuild 
productive and export capacity.  In the long run it was expected that such European 
and Japanese recovery would benefit the US by widening markets for American 
exports.’ 
In addition to international regulation as outlined above, the Golden Age also 
involved institutional and behavioural regulations, which produced 
compatibility between individual behaviour and macro-economic pattern. This 
involved the wage-price system, the distribution between profits and wages 
and the state fiscal and credit policies to guarantee incomes and maintain 
demand. To take a simple example, productivity wage bargaining in Europe 
became a core feature of industrial relations in the period after the war. This 
arose partly from the political economy of the post-World War 2 period and 
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the presence of well- established communist parties in many countries. At the 
end of World War 2, the Soviet Union had a great deal going for it. It had just 
won a war against a super-industrial power, Germany. The crimes of the Stalin 
period had not yet been made public. Thus, despite the split between 
communist and Catholic trade unions, the West European ruling circles were 
obliged to make genuine concessions to the workers. This is how productivity-
based bargaining came to be accepted with the fundamental idea that the 
workers had a right to equitable sharing of the fruits of economic progress.  
This brought into being a social market economy with representation by 
workers on supervisory boards of corporations. Germany is the best example 
of this evolution. See further GHLS (1990) and Eichengreen (2007).  
Turning now to the macro-economic path followed by advanced countries 
during the Golden Age, its central features may be summarised as follows: 
(i)  Rapid and parallel growth of productivity and capital stock per 
worker; 
(ii) The parallel growth of real wages and productivity. 
The significance of these two relations is that they guarantee both a roughly 
constant profit rate and roughly equal growth rates of consumption and 
production, thus ratifying the rapid rate of accumulation.  Simple econometric 
estimates based on the experience of capitalist countries for the last hundred 
years suggest that for every 1% faster growth of capital stock per worker 
employed, hourly labour productivity rose by 0.75%.  GHLS note that on 
average capital stock per worker grew around 2.5% per year faster over the 
period 1950-73 than during 1870-1913.  This would account for about two-
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thirds of the 3 percentage points increase (from about 1.5% to almost 4.5%) in 
the productivity growth actually observed.  
To complement the above figures, it may also be useful to note that 
investment as a proportion of GDP rose in leading industrial countries during 
the Golden Age. In France, gross fixed investment  as a share of GDP excluding 
housing investment rose from 12% in the 1920s and 1930s to 14% in the 1950s 
and 17% in the 1960s; the corresponding figures for Germany show an increase 
from 11% to 17% in the 1950s and 18% in the 1960s. In the UK gross fixed non-
housing investment as a proportion of GDP rose from 6% in the 1920s and 
1930s to 12 % in the 1950s and 15% in the 1960s (Eichengreen 2007). 
This Golden Age growth inevitably took place at very different rates in different 
countries (fastest in Japan, slowest in the US and UK and continental European 
countries somewhere in between). There was also a rapid increase of 
international trade between advanced countries during this time-span.  
However the starting point of this trade was very low as the inter-war period 
was marked by widespread trade protection, currency instability and general 
depression in much of the developed world.  
3) Alternative explanations for the rise of the Golden Age 
As Matthews and Bowen remarked, whereas there are many theories for the 
fall of the Golden Age, there are hardly any for its rise. Golden Age was a 
totally unexpected phenomenon. Most economists had expected the post- 
WWII period to be marked by high unemployment and low aggregate demand.  
Many of the explanations provided for the unexpected strong performance of 
the post-WWII tend to be monocausal and therefore easily dismissed. A 
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comprehensive institutional analysis similar to that of GHLS (1990) and Singh 
(2008) is a comparatively recent one by Eichengreen (2007). The theoretical 
basis for his analysis lies in cooperative dynamic game theory (see Van der 
Ploeg 1987 and Grout 1984). This, Eichengreen suggests, was made possible by 
institutional solutions which were adopted by European countries to remedy 
(a) co-ordination problems both internally and externally and (b) time 
consistency problems. 
Following Van der Ploeg and Grout, Eichengreen suggests that welfare is 
maximized when workers moderate their wage claims in order to make profits 
available to enterprise. Capitalists restrain dividend pay-outs in order to re-
invest. Investment stimulates growth, raising the future incomes of both 
capitalists and workers. In the co-operative equilibrium in which both workers 
and capitalists exercise restraint, the costs of foregoing current consumption 
are dominated by benefits of future increase in incomes accruing to both. 
Where Eichengreen (2007) differs from GHLS (2007) and Singh (2008) is his 
suggestion that the most important motivation for the new post World War 2 
institutional arrangements was the experience of the Great Depression of the 
1930s, which exposed widespread coordination failure of the market economy. 
He suggests that corporatists solutions were a part of the European tradition 
since at least Bismarck. His analysis differs not only from GHLS and Singh 
(op.cit.) both of whom, as seen above, emphasize the post World War 2 
European conjecture in the rise of new institutions but also from that of Olsen 
(1982, 1996). Olsen’s argument, which has been widely influential, is that the 
destruction of the old institutions and vested interests connected with them 
leads to fast economic growth. On the contrary, Eichengreen (2007) analysis 
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emphasizes the continuity of the old and new corporatist institutions rather 
than the demise of the old to explain the rise of the Golden Age. 
4) The fall of the golden Age 
 
Unlike the rise of the Golden Age, there are many more theories and 
hypotheses concerning its fall. A leading cause of the failure of the Golden Age 
was the long-term trend decline in the rate of growth of productivity, 
beginning in the late 1960s. In addition, there was increased militancy among 
workers after 20 years of full employment. This was reflected in the May 1968 
events in France and the increased strike activity in European countries. 
Workers abandoned wage moderation, leading to a breakdown of the basic 
Golden Age consensus over profits and wages. This also resulted in a profit 
squeeze and lower investment by employers. Further, the international 
economic system suffered a huge shock with the end of the gold convertibility 
of the US Dollar and the virtual demise of the Bretton Woods system. This also 
could be expected to lower the propensity to invest. 
 
In summary, analysis and evidence point to three proximate economic causes 
of the fall of the Golden Age: (a) productivity slow down due to exogenous 
factors as well as reduced scope for catch-up as the European economies 
developed; (b) the unravelling of the Golden Age consensus over wages and 
profits and (c) the breakdown or at least a big question mark over the 
international framework for trade and capital flows with the end of the Bretton 
Woods system. The latter can be ascribed in part to the success of the Golden 
Age itself and that of the US policies to strengthen the economies of its allies in 
Western Europe and Japan. This resulted in varied evolution of competitive 
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capacities of the leading industrial economies. Thus, over the two decades  
1950 to 1970, the US share of the world exports of manufactures declined 
from 27.3% to 18.5%. Over the same period, the West German share showed a 
matching improvement from 7.3% in 1950 to 19.8% in 1970. Similarly, during 
these twenty years, the UK’s share of world manufacturing exports declined 
from 25.5% to 10.8% whilst that of Japan improved from 3.4% to 11.7%. The 
relatively poor trading performance of the reserve currency countries, namely 
the US and the UK, contributed to the difficulties of the Bretton Woods system.   
In relation to the breakdown of the consensus on wages and profits, Kalecki 
(1943) in a famous paper had suggested that full employment capitalism was 
not a viable proposition because employers need to have the power of the 
sack to discipline workers. In fact, what actually happened in the demise of the 
Golden Age were the excessive wage demands of workers rather than the 
capitalists prevailing on the government to keep a reserve army of the 
unemployed. 
 
5) Summing Up the Golden Age 
The foregoing analytical narrative raises the question of what lessons 
can be drawn from the rise and fall of the Golden Age for achieving 
and maintaining full employment in advanced countries. 
The main lessons from the Golden Age may be summarised as 
follows: 
A cooperative economic regime at the national and international 
level, based on appropriate institutions, can deliver outstanding 
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economic success, including full employment, fast growth of 
productivity and real wages in the North as well as rapid 
industrialisation in the South in a positive sum game.  At the national 
level the appropriate institutions were those of a social market 
economy committed to fast economic growth, full employment and 
equitable distribution of the fruits of economic progress.  At the 
international level it required inter alia institutional arrangements 
that permit balance of payments disequilibrium between countries 
to be resolved with higher rates of growth, real world demand, as 
well as national demand and output.  It may be noted that the latter 
arrangements represent a solution to the problem articulated by 
Keynes in the following terms: 
‘The problem of maintaining equilibrium in the balance of payments 
between countries has never been solved …the failure to solve this 
problem has been a major cause of impoverishment and social 
discontent and even of wars and revolutions…to suppose that there 
exists some smoothly functioning automatic mechanism of 
adjustment which preserves equilibrium if only we trust to matters 
of laissez faire is a doctrinaire delusion which disregards the lessons 
of historical experience without having behind it the support of 
sound theory.’4 
The essential point here is that the balance of payments will always 
balance subject to rounding errors.  The important economic policy 
issue here is at what rate of economic growth will this balance occur.  
                                                          
4
 Moggridge (1980, pp.21-22) 
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In step with the national institutions, the international institutions 
during the Golden Age were also committed to fast growth and full 
employment.  Thus, for example, in the very first clause of the Pre-
amble to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) it is 
stated that ‘the contracting parties declared themselves as: 
Recognising that their relations in the field of trade and economic 
endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of 
living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing 
volume of real income and effective demand, developing the full 
uses of the resources of the world..’ 
Further, an important lesson of the Golden Age is that there should 
be coherence between internal and external regulation.  Also 
required is continual institutional change and renewal with changing 
circumstances.  This did not happen in the Golden Age, which greatly 
contributed to its demise. 
6)  Comments on the Entrepreneurial State 
As was indicated in section 1) this part of the paper will comment 
briefly on entrepreneurship.  Contrary to much of the literature, we 
shall argue here that modern states play an important 
entrepreneurial role in economic development.  The recent book by 
Mariana Muzzacato (2013) emphasises this point.  It may be useful 
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to illustrate this analytical point with some examples, first from the 
Third World and secondly from advanced countries.  
We start with the case of the Indian Communications Technology 
Industry (ICT industry).  ICT industry is regarded by many Indians and 
the conservative international media as being successful due to the 
fact that it had no government interference i.e. it benefitted from 
‘benign neglect’.  But this is simply a case of ignoring unwelcome 
facts.  The characterisation of ICT being regarded as an example of 
benign neglect by the government is grossly inaccurate and 
misleading.  India’s comparative advantage in software development 
stems from its competitive advantage in cheap skilled labour.  This 
advantage did not arise spontaneously but was helped, in fact 
established, by the government.  The evidence shows that the 
government helped the industry in a variety of ways in its early 
stages.  It provided the infrastructure, particularly the huge 
expansion of post high school education, free of course to the 
industry.  Similarly, the government helped develop the city of 
Bangalore as the hub for technological industries which greatly 
assisted their growth. 
Next we take up the case of probably the most important 
technological innovation in modern India – the case of the Green 
Revolution.  This involved close cooperation between the 
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government, the scientific community and the Punjabi5 peasants.  In 
a nutshell the government provided cheap loans and basic inputs to 
all farmers (fertilisers, seeds etc.).  The scientific input came from the 
collaboration between Ohio State University in the US and Punjab’s 
own agricultural university in Ludhiana.  The net result of this 
collaboration between the government, the universities and the 
private sector was that Punjab had a huge long term increase in both 
rising wheat production.  Before this enormous technical leap of the 
Green Revolution India was a basket case with respect to food grains 
and had to depend on hand-outs from the US to feed its people.  
After the Green Revolution the country became self-sufficient in food 
grain production. 
It may be interesting to next consider the connection between the 
entrepreneurial state and the Keynesian analysis.  The late Professor 
Kaldor provided a classic statement on this point from a Keynesian 
perspective.  He advocated public investment as part of a national 
plan where it is possible to take into account all kinds of indirect 
effects which would not be possible with private investment.  Keynes 
had argued that in the face of complete uncertainty investors 
generally rely on a convention that the future will be just like the 
present and for that reason the effects of the existing situation 
                                                          
5
 The Green Revolution took place largely in the Punjab 
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enter, in a sense disproportionally, into the formation of long term 
expectations.  Hence capacity is only likely to be created insofar as its 
use appears to be profitable at the existing state of demand.  Since 
the demand for commodities depends on the levels of incomes 
which are generated in production the additional production 
generated in the future by the sum of the investment decisions of 
the present will itself increase the demand for commodities in 
comparison with the present level – a factor which private investors 
cannot take into account (or can do so only imperfectly) since they 
take their decisions independently of each other.  Investment by 
public enterprises, on the other hand, can take the comprehensive 
effect of all investments into account in judging the social 
profitability of any particular investment project.  It should be noted, 
however, that a state plan is capable of doing this even when the 
investment is undertaken by private enterprises, as the Japanese 
example shows.  What is required is that there be a fairly 
comprehensive state investment plan for industrial development and 
that state should be capable of implementing this plan. 
To sum up, an entrepreneurial state will certainly help economic 
growth.  To get faster growth and permanent full employment, from 
a Keynesian perspective, a fairly comprehensive state investment 
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plan for industrial development is required, as well as the ability of 
the state to implement this plan.  
In conclusion, it is necessary to draw attention to a recent important 
contribution by Mariana Mazzucato (2013). She emphasises 
important lessons vital for effective institutionalisation of innovation. 
There is need to strengthen sources of funding for public R&D. She 
argues that the negative image of the state in relation to innovation 
needs to be changed. She suggests there are a whole host of 
innovations which the state has done, particularly in US, which the 
private sector could not do. She regards innovation as the main force 
driving growth in the market economy. It is therefore vital to 
continue to direct public resources into catalysing innovation. These 
are important ideas for the development of the entrepreneurial state 
which deserve full-fledged further research. 
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Table 1: Level and rates of Growth of Real GDP/Person, 1950-95  
($1990GK and % per year) 
Adapted from: Crafts, N. (2012) Western Europe’s Growth Prospects – A Historical 
Perspective, Warwick University CAGE Working Paper No. 71, p.23 
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Table 2: Level and rates of Growth of Real GDP/Hour Worked, 1950-95  
($1990GK and % per year) 
Adapted from: Crafts, N. (2012) Western Europe’s Growth Prospects – A Historical 
Perspective, Warwick University CAGE Working Paper No. 71, p.24 
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Table 3: Growth Characteristics of Different Phases for OECD Developed 
Countries, 1820 – 1979  
( Arithmetic average of figures for the individual countries)  
Adapted from: Maddison (1982) 
Source: Glyn, A., Hughes, A., Lipietz, A. and Singh, A. (1987) The rise and fall of the Golden 
Age, Department of Applied Economics, DAE Working Paper , University of Cambridge 
 
 
a Average for 13 countries 
b Average for 10 countries 
                                               (Annual average compound growth rates) 
Phases GDP GDP per 
head of 
population 
Tangible 
reproducible 
non-
residential 
fixed capital 
stock 
Volume of 
exports 
I (1820 – 1870) 2.2a 1.0a (n.a.) 4.0b 
I (1870 - 1913) 2.5 1.4 2.9 3.9 
II (1913 – 1950) 1.9 1.2 1.7 1.0 
III (1950 – 1973) 4.9 3.8 5.5 8.6 
IV (1973 – 1979) 2.5 2.0 4.4c 4.8 
 Page 22 
 
c 1973 – 1978 
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